THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE CONFLICT IN EX-YUGOSLAVIA FOR THE EUROPEAN SECURITY*

Summary: In the paper it is stressed that the national question has once again become a top issue of debate in international politics, indicating that the 1989-1990 events were interpreted inadequately. In other words, international factors, triumphant about the collapse of communism, overlooked the danger stemming from the growth of nationalism. Former Yugoslavia is the clearest example, where the national conflict has turned into a grave challenge to European security, particularly since the nationalist euphoria seems to be spreading to other parts of Europe and the world.

Further, attention is concentrated upon defining and analyzing „ethnic nationalism”, distinguishing between national identity and nationalism as ideology, and pointing to the double meaning of the concept of nation in the sense of „ethnic” and „civic”. It is asserted that ethnic nationalism, striving for a „tribal unification” and homogenization of a people on its own territory with an ethnically based state destroyed Yugoslavia as a state and led to civil war. Conditions are also examined which resulted in the eventual domination of ethnic conception of the nation and ethnic nationalism, as opposed to democratically solving national question and constituting the neglected national identity.

In the second part of the paper the policy of the European Union toward the solution of the conflict in former Yugoslavia is considered and it is concluded that it always responded post-factum rather than timely and preventively, underestimating the destructive power of nationalism in a country so ethnically mixed as former Yugoslavia. Thus neither the European Union can be resolved of certain responsibility for the tragic outcome of national conflicts in this part of the world, though the primary sources must be sought in the internal circumstances and events. It is finally concluded that the international community should learn its lesson from the Yugoslav case, above all, to adopt a more appropriate interpretation of demands for national self-determination, which in multiethnic states must not be interpreted in the sense of creating ethnically pure nation-states.

Key words: national identity, ethnic nationalism, „ethnic” and „civic” nation, international community, European security.

Introduction

I shall begin this exposition with a thesis that "national question" has returned to the forefront of debates in international politics. "Today, with nationalism reinvigorated and wreaking havoc in parts of the globe where it long since has been considered a phenomenon of the past" - as Liah Greenfeld put it - the ex-Yugoslavia of which is the most tragic example - the whole Europe is confronted with a need for the new policy of security, which would prevent regression to elementary level of nationalism (see: L. Greenfeld, 1992: VII).

It signals an error in the interpretation of the events of 1989/90, namely, that international forces which triumphed over the collapse of communism lost sight of the dangers arising with the growing nationalism.

The case of Yugoslavia, as its most obvious victim, represents one of the greatest challenges to the policy of the European security. However, the intensification of national conflicts in ex-Yugoslavia which ended in a bloody and irrational inter-ethnic war, may not remain an isolated case but may be renewed in another multiethnic state unless the flame of an exclusive and particularistic nationalism is extinguished.

Therefore, it is very important to clearly define the notion of nationalism in order to prepare ourselves for coping with its enormous negative energy. First and foremost, it is necessary to make a clear-cut distinction between national identity as nationhood which may be freely chosen, i.e. as a feeling of belonging to a political and cultural community, and ethnic nationalism which links people by a common ancestral origin in terms of "blood and soil" ties, implying that the links are not chosen but prescribed only to the members of that community, in relation to which the others are treated as outsiders and potential enemies. That is, the distinction between civic and ethnic nation should be recognized, because it is the latter that emanates the negative energy which can explode if a society has no inbuilt mechanisms for controlling and resolving the tensions, as was the case in ex-Yugoslavia.

In such an interpretation the phenomenon of nationalism is far from being harmless, as it appeared in the statements of many of its defenders who seemed to welcome its emergence in the second half of this century, without being aware of its destructive force.

It was such a kind of nationalism that destroyed ex-Yugoslavia as a multinational and multicultural community. Who will be the next if this misfortune will be furtherly treated improperly?

This is the reason why we should speak of the implications of the national conflicts in ex-Yugoslavia for the European security. But we should also ask whether the European Community has so far undertaken appropriate steps in order to safeguard its security by preventing such outcomes of national conflicts in certain regions of Eastern and South-East Europe? Since we live in the age of neo-nationalism it is necessary to elaborate the proper policy in order to direct the national feelings towards their democratic resolution and avoid destructive force of ultranationalism.

1. The nature of the crisis in ex-Yugoslavia in the beginning of the 1990's

Joseph Rothchild wrote that Yugoslavia was historically, religiously and culturally the most complicated state amongst East-Central European countries (1974:201). It is because Yugoslavia as a multinational community was composed of ethnicities of historically and culturally different backgrounds. Therefore as to the period after World War Two it is very important to consider how the national question has been treated by the communist policy.

The Yugoslav Communist party which came out as the winner in the war against the German occupation, when the war was over continued with the policy based on the ideology of "brotherhood and unity" applied in the liberation war. Thus the federation of the constituent nations was constituted assuming political and cultural equality of all nations but without strictly fixing republics' autonomies until the 1974 Constitution. The latter gave rise to the concept of the "nation-states" when defining republics as the autonomous state units, even lifting to that status two provinces of Serbia. Until then nationalism had not been stimulated but rather was fairly controlled by the charismatic leader. Even though nations' and national minorities' rights were recognized, the official policy did not pay much attention to the national question assuming that
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it was resolved in the liberation war. On the other side, the policy was not oriented towards the creation of the feeling of "Yugoslavism" as a ground of the modern concept of nation as a political and cultural unit.

This should be considered in the context of Yugoslav postwar history. The roots of the Yugoslav social and economic crisis may be traced in the 1948 break with the Soviet block, which in fact did not mean the complete rejection of Stalinism as ideology and as the conception of one-party political structure. The policy which followed that break may be characterized as a combination of a mild trend towards liberalization in the field of economic reforms, which allowed a limited market to appear, and Bolshevism in regards with the constitution of the state as a political unit based on one-party rule and mono-organizational model. Such a contradictory foundation was the source of the incessant tensions, which fettered society's real democratic transformation.

Still, thanks to such even partial reforms Yugoslavia became one of the most advanced communist countries: its standard of life was much higher than in Eastern Europe; it opened its borders to free flow of both the ideas and people; it allowed the emigration of the labor force diminishing thus the unemployment rate; it opened rooms to the enterprises' and regional autonomy when introducing self-management, even though under its facade a dictatorial rule of a very strong charismatic leader and monopoly power of the party-state were hidden, arresting any political reform which could have threatened one-party rule.

Viewed from that standpoint one may understand why social change was allowed only in terms of semi-reforms reduced to the limited development of the market which was constantly supervised by a strong party-state. Such a half-way liberalization was, however, an alibi used to reject any form of oppositional (underground) movement, restricting rebellion to small groups of dissidents whose influence was very limited (primarily to the students and intellectuals). Hence, after the breakdown of "real socialism" Yugoslavia was confronted with the absence of a viable political force capable of undertaking the process of a democratic transformation. That was the source of an apparent paradox, namely that Yugoslavia, which was much ahead until 1989 in comparison with the East-Central European countries, faced the greater difficulties in the period of transition, adding to the above-mentioned its multinational problems. This must be viewed in light of the growing disintegrative forces beginning with 1970's which actually turned the Yugoslav state into a fragile co-federation incapable of controlling and directing the growing aspirations toward national liberation, stimulating separation and causing dissolution of the Yugoslav state. This trend prevailed over the need for a democratic transformation in 1990's.

Next question to be considered is the following: why this new nationalism, which reemerged in ex-Yugoslavia in 1990’s emanated primarily a negative energy. The answer may be found in the fact that a/ the dissolution of the Yugoslav state was not an easy problem, because large numbers of Yugoslav peoples lived within one of the others "national" territory, which is to say that territories were so ethnically mixed that the call for separation meant a threat to the other nation’s minorities; and b/ national liberation was not defined in terms of an orientation towards the future, i.e. to the democratic transformation of the ancient authoritarian regime, but rather its orientation was towards the past, that is, to a romantic dream of ethnically based nation-states as the fulfillment of historical myths of a "great Serbia" or a "great Croatia". In other words, glorification of one’s own nation assumed the negative attitudes, based on the prejudices, against the other nations, that produced xenophobia. That is to say, a weak democratic foundation of ex-Yugoslavia turned national liberation movements against the integration and globalization - the trends prevailing in Western Europe.

When after the fall of the "Berlin wall" in 1989 all East-Central European countries were confronted with primarily democratic quests expressed as: 1. the abolition of the principle of the ruling party, 2. the establishment of the multiparty system, and 3. a free election - the Yugoslav political elites were preoccupied with the dilemma: whether federation or co-federation, and overwhelmed with the quest for national self-determination, pushing aside the request concerning a democratic reconstruction of the state.

Therefore, democratic principles were interpreted in light of national question. For that reason the multiparty system meant primarily a possibility to form political organizations along the national line, the result of which was the constitution of national
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parties in all the former republics of Yugoslavia and their competition for national power. The fact was that national parties became the ruling ones in all the regions, which may explain why their main objective was to strengthen the newly formed nation-states, regardless their political structure, which represented rather a continuation of the former authoritarian state than its democratic transformation. The ruling role of the national (or rather, nationalistically-minded) parties (in Serbia SPS, in Croatia CDU, in Bosnia and Herzegovina Muslim Party for Democratic Action) represented the main obstacle to the democratic transformation of ex-Yugoslavia logically leading to its dissolution.

Democratization was thus substituted for national self-determination in terms of the creation of ethnically-based states. The main slogan at the beginning of 1990's in ex-Yugoslavia was: „National self-determination first, democracy afterwards”, considering „the right of self-determination as the right of ethnically defined nations to secede from federation regardless of the mass violence such an act would surely entail“ (V. Pešić, 1996: 30).

When keeping in mind that it was a time of the profound social-economic crisis in ex-Yugoslavia, it became clear why such an overturned perspective deepened the national conflicts and led them at the end to the inter-ethnic war in Croatia and Bosnia. Under the conditions of economic crisis all the republics had a feeling as being threatened by the others, which was interpreted more in terms of „economic injustice“ than as a cultural and political oppression, because a/ in cultural terms all the nations had rights to follow their national traditions, and b/ when politics was in question, the whole population was in the same position characterized by the absence of civil rights and liberties, which meant that the citizens and not particularly the nations were deprived of these rights. When having in mind the latter, it called, first and foremost, for a democratic process in order to incorporate basic human rights in a democratically constituted state, on whose basis the improvement of national/ethnic rights could have been achieved as well. However, what dominated among Tito’s successors, who were second-hand quality leaders, was struggle for power, instead of social awareness of the existing crisis and of the growing ethnic conflicts.

While the Yugoslav population has still lived peacefully and has not been yet contaminated by an exclusive and aggressive nationalism (what the results of sociological investigations during 1980’s confirmed), in the beginning of 1990’s the national political elites started with an aggressive propaganda persuading their people that living together became impossible and suggesting dissolution of the Yugoslav state as the only resolution. Only Serbian government did not follow in these steps because Yugoslavia was the framework within which all the Serbs could live together in the same state. However, the Serbian party leadership also relied upon a nationalistic movement in order to strengthen its power, recalling the Serbian historical myths and the memory to genocide against Serbs during the World War Two under the nacist regime in Croatia. Thereby, the war through mass media preceded the actual inter-ethnic war, changing rapidly the attitudes of the population with regards to the other peoples which lived in Yugoslavia, but also vis-à-vis their own nations which were glorified and opposed to the „inferior ethnicities“ (Slovenes and Croats treated themselves as superior „westernized“ nations as opposed to „barbarian“ Serbs; Serbs glorified themselves as a „heroic nation“ which was in all wars on „the right side“, etc.).

Empirical research carried out in Serbia in 1993 showed the rapid growth of nationalism and animosities in the last decade towards the other Yugoslav nations (the results of which are presented in Z. Golubović, B. Kuzmanović, M. Vasović, 1995), which might be observed in the other former republics of Yugoslavia too.

Unlike the situation before 1990’s, the situation rapidly changed since then thanks to the fact that ultranationalism as an exclusive, aggressive and militant attitude, was imposed from above, first by the national political elites, then aided by cultural elites. Lust for power stayed behind the intentions of the former, while the latter was led by an imagined national missionary role, which national intelligentsia had always pretended to play among Slavs.

This hidden motive of the Yugoslav national elites was not recognized by the international community, which took for granted their declarations for self-determination as identical to democratization. Such a misinterpretation which replaced the concept of „people“ with „ethnicities“ territorially localized in certain republics, made a basic frame of reference for conceptualizing the destiny of the Yugoslav state, the request of Slovenia and Croatia for
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separation, as well as the definition of the „aggressor“ and the „victim“, etc.

A Yugoslav author writes: „The violent breakup of Yugoslavia demonstrates the inability of the international community to rely on any solid legal principles, guidelines or established mechanisms to avoid such chaos and mass suffering when constituent parts of these types of multinational states decide to go their own way“ (Vesna Pešić, 1996). And when the Yugoslav state collapsed, the attempt to draw the international frontiers on the ethnic basis in Bosnia led to the division and segregation of ethnic communities, inevitably producing „ethnically pure“ areas and armed coercion as well as armed resistance (see: Nansen Behar, 1996: 101).

2. Responsibility of International (European) community for the intensification of national conflicts in ex-Yugoslavia

A bloody destruction of the state and society in ex-Yugoslavia was not only a result of the collapse of the given order and the impact of the inner national tensions, but may also be interpreted in terms of a bankruptcy of internationalism which led to the revival of nationalism of the elementary level (see: Francois Furet, 1992).

A Yugoslav author who studies the European integration writes that national cultures have been so far oriented towards national individuation, contributing thus to the European particularism and disintegration (B. Stojković, 1995: 36). The trend which was obviously opposed to the West-European tendency towards integration. Were the officials of the European Community aware of this contradiction?

Tom King (1993: 63) wrote that in Yugoslavia the process of normal diplomacy has failed. Therefore, UN have much lessons to learn from their two most recent involvements in the Gulf and in Yugoslavia with regards to the strategy, i.e. how to be involved with persuasion and peaceful presence before the crisis breaks and before real killing starts. This was pointed out by another Yugoslav author saying that the reactions of UN and the other international agencies to the international conflicts have been so far counterproductive, because they customarily undertake the retroactive and punitive measures instead of preventive ones. E.g. if they reacted as soon as the first signs of the state crisis in Yugoslavia appeared by organizing a conference on Yugoslavia in order to establish rules how the crisis could be dealt with; or if European Community accepted the intention of ex-Yugoslavia in the mid-eighties to join EC, its problems as a part of the community might have been easier solved (S. Stojanović, 1995: 116-117). And we may add: if the Yugoslav Prime Minister, Ante Marković, got a real economic and political support in 1991 from the international community, his programme for saving and democratizing the Yugoslav state might have succeeded.

Taking as an example the crisis in ex-USSR and ex-Yugoslavia Mikail Gorbachev wrote about the negative impacts of the fragmentation of the states and nations, saying that any further fragmentation of the states according to the ethnic criteria would be apt to send the existing international structure into chaos (speech of M. Gorbachev at the Win Conference). And he rightly so put into question the motives of certain countries which were in a hurry to recognize Slovenia and Croatia, not to speak of Bosnia.

I. Iveković stated that European Community failed to adequately solve the conflict in Yugoslavia because it had no strategic projection for the future with regards to a more „common“ policy. Therefore, Maastricht Treaty did not create a mechanism for the effective implementation of common foreign and security policy (1996).

The European Community did not follow the suggestion of Badinter Commission in January 15, 1992 which proposed the recognition of Slovenia and Macedonia, but not Croatia due to its discriminatory legislation against minorities. The same author also posed the question regarding the responsibility of the international community for the failure of the first peace plan for Bosnia in March 1992 in Lisbon, which was at first signed by both Serbs and Muslims, but later rejected by the latter – with a good reason for doubt that it was done under the suggestion of a powerful force.

According to Thomas Fleiner, international community had an illusion that by recognizing the unilaterally declared independence of some of the republics of ex-Yugoslavia, it would and could contribute to a peaceful settlement, while the events demystified such an illusion (1994: 73).

After the unsuccessful peace treaty, war in Bosnia enormously escalated and brought thousands of deaths ruining the entire
separation, as well as the definition of the „aggressor“ and the „victim“, etc.

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country. The outcome of this irrational war was an intense inter-ethnic hatred which resulted in "ethnic cleansing" that left a huge masses of all the nations' population without homeland. Could the international community prevent such a disaster? I believe yes, if the common interest of Europe and an international solidarity have prevailed over the particular interests either of individual governments, or of the European Union which gave priority to its own unity over a long-run strategic projection of the future of Europe. If a support to the preservation of the Yugoslav state and its democratic transformation was more material than declarative; if the decisions were guided by the knowledge about the historical development of the Yugoslav nations, which could have indicated where an accelerated separation may lead, i.e. that an aggressive nationalism, which stood behind such a request for the secession could not but lead to the war in such an ethnically mixed territory; if the international democratic forces were more interested in making contacts and supporting the Yugoslav democratic movements, which existed in all of its parts, instead of exclusively communicating with the nationalist leaderships and relying upon their pseudo-democratic declarations. But all the above-mentioned "ifs" were missing. And all of the international interventions failed to basically grasp the complexity of the situation.

That is the reason why one may state that the catastrophic results of the Yugoslav conflict are partly produced by the inadequate European Community's foreign policy; therefore the consequences for the European security under the influence of the Yugoslav conflict, are also in the domain of the European responsibility. This is not to say that the federal leadership and national political elites in ex-Yugoslavia are to be amnestied from their responsibility. On the contrary, I believe that the inner conflicts and incapability of the Yugoslav political and cultural elites to cope with them produced the Yugoslav tragedy. Still, if the EC implemented a wiser foreign policy, it might have prevented the catastrophe.

3. What are the consequences of Yugoslav conflicts for the European security?

If an analogy of the French writer, G. Sorman (in his book Going out of Socialism) is right that the fall of the "Berlin wall" is equal to the fall of Roman Empire, the question should be raised: has Europe had time to prepare itself to face such a grandiose turnover and react accordingly?

I think that both Western and Eastern Europe believed that once the communist regimes have been eliminated, the question of a democratic transformation and integration of the countries of "real socialism" into the European Community would be more or less automatic - but developments proved them wrong.

As professor Hans Kung (1993: 52) put it: the integration calls for "world ethos", however, it is not a question of exporting a model, an artificial globalization", or "the concept of universality" as opposed to the "concept of regionality". He appealed for a "relative universality" which recognizes co-existence of differing entities, and I would add, in particular national entities. Within such a concept, if it has been implemented in ex-USSR and ex-Yugoslavia, the basis to the preservation of the multinational states could have been built, as against mono-national and mono-cultural states which promoted a radical ethnification of politics.

The "European Constitution" declared a need for new legal-political order which would make impossible the regression to nationalist particularism. However, this declaration has not been put into practice when the problems arose. Instead of working on the creation of a new "world ethos", the European Union was engaged in making a new "closed community" where only the most developed privileged states could have access. That is to say, as being afraid of the intrusion of East European countries into "our community", the European Union made barriers and new boundaries vis-à-vis non-members of the Union, defining thus the European security in narrow terms. From which one may conclude that the mentality of the "Cold War" has not been yet transcended, and Western and Eastern Europe have not come much closer.

Richard Falk (1994: 57) explained the situation in Europe after the collapse of communism as follows: "The breakup of Yugoslavia has unleashed a prolonged challenge to European security that has not been met, and whatever the outcome, will leave ugly scars from waiting too long and doing too little; the flow of refugees and other foreigners into Western European countries is severely threatening to a politics of moderation and tolerance in several countries, especially in Germany; the emancipation of Eastern Europe from Soviet hegemony and Communist rule inflicted many hardships on these societies in the course of their transition to
country. The outcome of this irrational war was an intense interethnic hatred which resulted in "ethnic cleansing" that left a huge mass of all the nations' population without homeland. Could the international community prevent such a disaster? I believe yes, if the common interest of Europe and an international solidarity have prevailed over the particular interests either of individual governments, or of the European Union which gave priority to its own unity over a long-run strategic projection of the future of Europe. If a support to the preservation of the Yugoslav state and its democratic transformation was more material than declarative; if the decisions were guided by the knowledge about the historical development of the Yugoslav nations, which could have indicated where an accelerated separation may lead, i.e. that an aggressive nationalism, which stood behind such a request for the secession could not but lead to the war in such an ethnically mixed territory; if the international democratic forces were more interested in making contacts and supporting the Yugoslav democratic movements, which existed in all of its parts, instead of exclusively communicating with the nationalist leaderships and relying upon their pseudodemocratic declarations. But all the above-mentioned "ifs" were missing. And all of the international interventions failed to basically grasp the complexity of the situation.

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market economies; the collapse of the Soviet Empire has generated a cycle of vicious ethnic politics in several of the former republics, as well as producing a continual constitutional and economic crisis in the Soviet Union..." He also adds that even though the "Cold War" is definitely over, no appropriate architecture of regional security has yet emerged, and if taking the case of Bosnia, one may notice a regression in terms of cooperative capacity in the security domain. The same author thinks that Western diplomacy in case of Yugoslavia was a "gross mismanagement" because "Yugoslavian breakdown is not perceived as linked closely to any issue of major strategic importance" (p. 63); and continues: "The inability to act early and effectively in relation to war in ex-Yugoslavia underscored the inability of Europe to act in unity within the broad domain of regional security in post-Cold War circumstances..." (p. 69).

Disintegration of Yugoslavia does not indicate only collapse of a multinational state, but more than that, it is a sign of a regression towards national particularism which represents a great challenge to European integration and its common foreign and security policy. As mentioned earlier, if such a tendency to fragmentation escalates (and we see new movements towards so-called national self-determination in Great Britain, in Spain, in Italy and elsewhere), European security would be at stake, for the multiplication of small independent states makes the communication and peace control more difficult, because separation contributes to the growing intolerance and distrust.

According to Maastricht "Provisions on a Common Foreign and Security Policy", the relationships between the "member states" are defined in terms of their cooperation and coordination in their relations with third countries. Does this document provide a clear definition of the "member states" and third countries, in terms of internal and external sovereignty in European Community's policy, in order to find "solutions for serious conflicts on its soil, or for efficient prevention of actions of undemocratic regimes" (see: S. Samardžić, 1994: 106).

Has the European Community any lesson to learn from the case of Yugoslavia so as to find the better way for cooperation, in particular with East-Central Europe?

One of the most complex and difficult problems Europe is faced with today is a controversy between the quest for national self-determination and the growing need for globalization. This implies that both concepts should be clearly defined and reconciled, so as to avoid misjudgments and secure world peace which has already been imperiled due to the violation of the balance of those opposed tendencies. The best way for the European Community to safeguard European security is to support (with economic aids not only declarations) democratic reforms in ex-Yugoslavia and the other East-Central European countries, conceptualizing thus self-determination more in terms of political determination towards democracy rather than as territorial separation (i.e. the creation of "nation-states").

We may conclude with a question posed by a Yugoslav author when treating the Yugoslav case in European context: "For whom the bell tolls", and with her reply: "Not only for Yugoslavia" (R. Nakarada, 1994: 54).

References


Golubović Z., Kuzmanović B., Vasović M. 1995, Drustveni karakter i društvene promene u svetu nacionalnih konflikata (Social Character and Social Change in Light of National Conflicts), Filip Višnjic, Beograd.


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Zagorka Golubović

IMPLIKACIJE KONFLIKTA U BIVŠOJ JUGOSLAVIJI ZA EVROPSKU SIGURNOST

Rezime

U tekstu se naglašava da je nacionalno pitanje ponovo došlo u vrh debate u međunarodnoj politici, što ukazuje na greške u interpretaciji događaja iz 1989/90. tj. da su međunarodne snage, triumfujući zbog kolapsa komunizma, izgubile iz vida opsanost koja je nastala sa porastom nacionalizma. Za to je najčešće podigli primer bivše Jugoslavije, u kojoj je nacionalni konflikt postao najznačajniji izazov evropskoj sigurnosti, pogotovo što događaji ukazuju na to da nacionalistička euforia eskalira i na druga delove Evrope i sveta.

Dalje se pažnja usredresuje na definisanje i analizu „etničkog nacionalizma”, praveći razliku između nacionalnog identiteta i nacionalizma kao ideologije i ukazujući na dvostruko značenje pojma nacija u smislu „etnički” i „civik”. Konstatuje se da je etnički nacionalizam koji teži „plemenskom ujedinjenju” i homogenizaciji jednog naroda na vlastitoj teritoriji sa etnički utemeljenom državom, razorio Jugoslaviju kao državu i doveo do građanskog rata. Razmatraju se i uslovi koji su doveli do toga da prevladala etničko shvatanje nacije i etnički nacionalizam, nasuprot demokratskom rešavanju nacionalnog pitanja i konstituisanju zaneslornog nacionalnog identiteta.

U drugom delu teksta tretira se politika Evropske zajednice u odnosu na razrešenje konflikta u bivšoj Jugoslaviji i konstatuje se da je ona uvek reagovala post-festum a ne blagovremeno i preventivno, podcenjujući destruktivnu snagu nacionalizma u etnički toliko izmešanoj državi, kao što je bila bivša Jugoslavija, te da ni Evropska zajednica ne može izbaci odgovornost za tragičan ishod nacionalnih konfliktata na ovim prostorima, mada se primarni uzroci moraju tražiti u unutrašnjim okolnostima i događajima. Konstatuje se, stoga, da međunarodna zajednica treba da izvuče poucak iz slučaja Jugoslavije, a pre svega, da adekvatno tumači zahtev za nacionalnim samoopredeljenjem, koje se u višenacionalnim državama ne može interpretirati u smislu stvaranja etnički čistih nacija-država.

Ključne reči: nacionalni identitet, etnički nacionalizam, „etnički” i „civik” nation, međunarodna zajednica, evropska sigurnost.
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